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Qassem Soleimani receiving the Iran’s highest military honour, the Order
of Zolfaghar, from Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei, March 2019. Source:
Prachatai, Flickr
Iran excels at nurturing paramilitary forces across the Middle East.
When it comes to cultivating persuasive ‘soft power’ amongst publics
more broadly in the region, however, it has a chequered record. Iran has
historically enjoyed a measure of Arab public sympathy for its nuclear
programme. Iranian resistance to US and Israeli agendas has
furthermore earned the regime a degree of popular acclaim: regional
approval ratings of the leadership rose markedly after Hezbollah took
on Israel in the 2006 Lebanon War. In the predominantly Sunni Arab
world, however, public opinion of the regime has plummeted since then,
particularly in light of its activities during the Arab Uprisings. Iran’s
sponsorship of mainly Shi’a militant groups stirred broad distrust of its
geopolitical intentions and lent credibility to the theory that it seeks to
create a ‘Shi’a crescent’ of in uence across the Middle East. Its
outreach programmes are often dismissed as bids to convert Iranian
clients to the Khomeinist doctrine of ‘wilayat al-faqih’ (Guardianship of
the Jurisprudent).
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Even in Iraq, where 65 percent of the population identify as Shi’a, there
had been growing resentment of pervasive Iranian in uence over
religious, political, security and cultural affairs. This in uence has been
extensive since regime change in 2003, but in mid-2014, ISIL’s military
campaign across Iraq seemingly gave a carte blanche to Iran’s Quds
Force to offer weaponry, technical support and advice to the Shi’a
militias which it has backed since the US occupation, and to foster the
growth of new ones formed to combat ISIL. Qassem Soleimani
operated in Iraq on the invitation of the Iraqi government (or at least
part of it) and continued to do so in the aftermath of ISIL’s defeat in
2017.
Iranian in uence in Iraq has deepened since then. The success of Fatah,
a political alliance of Iranian-backed militia leaders including those of
the Badr Organisation, Kata’ib Hezbollah, Asa’aib Ahl Al-Haq and the
Imam Ali Brigades, in the May 2018 parliamentary elections has
reinforced Iranian leverage over the government. Meanwhile, on the
ground, those same militias have taken control over large areas of
western and northern Iraq, where they have been able to generate
income from the local populace through a combination of deals with
local businesses, checkpoint tolls, exploitation of natural resources and
protection rackets.
To be sure, the Islamic Republic has always been better at ‘smart
power’ (combining coercive and economic power with persuasive
cultural in uence) than at either hard or soft power alone. Since its
formation, the regime has faced almost constant international
sanctions, limiting its conventional military capabilities and encouraging
reliance on more economical forms of guerrilla warfare. Ideologically,
while the regime sought from the outset to appeal to the
Muslim umma in the region overall, uptake of its initiatives has been
increasingly con ned to Shi’a communities. But Iran has made the most
of its limitations in Iraq, deriving smart power by manipulating the
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combination of identity politics, patronage networks, and coercion
which have become prevalent in Iraqi politics and society, and
permeating grassroots religious and charitable institutions and the
informal economy in ways that Western allies have neither the ability
nor the inclination to do.
Periodic polling by Al-Mustakella for Research between 2005 and
2019 suggests that amongst Iraq’s Shi’a, shifting views on whether Iran
is a reliable partner have roughly corresponded to the threat level posed
by Sunni militant jihadists at any given time (and potentially also the
presence or absence of US and allied forces). The 61% Shi’a approval
rating for Iran in 2005–6 during the  rst phase of sectarian con ict fell
to 26% after the US-led surge and military drawdown in 2009–10. During
the war against ISIL in 2014–15, approval for Iran hit 86%, but fell after
ISIL’s defeat to 49% in 2018–early 2019 (and just 36% when Sunnis were
included). Iran is clearly aware of this dynamic: its media outlets have
continually justi ed the country’s paramilitary role in Iraq by
emphasising the ongoing threat of Sunni militant extremists and of
‘Zionist-Crusader’ (principally American) forces in the country, long after
victory over ISIL was declared.
Amongst the generation of Iraqi Shi’a who grew up after the fall of
Saddam, however, there are many who reject this level of interference.
Polling in late 2019 amongst the predominantly young and Shi’a pro-
reform protesters in Baghdad and the southern provinces indicated that
only 1 percent trusted Iran (compared with 7 percent who trusted the
US, and 30 percent who trusted the UN). Over the past few months,
criticism of Iran’s role in promulgating entrenched corruption in Iraq has
become increasingly outspoken, and while Iranian-backed elements of
the security forces were reportedly responsible for repressive
crackdowns on protestors, in terms of public relations, Iran was on the
back foot. Iranian-sponsored Arab media were careful not to speak out
against Iraq’s senior religious authority, Sayyid al-Sistani, who defended
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the ‘legitimate demands’ of peaceful protestors. Rather, a common
reading of the protests by those outlets was to stress that agents
provocateurs had sabotaged the legitimate protests, leading to bloody
outcomes.
The assassination of Qassem Soleimani (along with Abu Mahdi al-
Muhandis, the de facto head of Iraq’s Popular Mobilisation Forces in the
Iraqi government) in a US drone strike on Baghdad airport last Friday
could well signal a death knell for the protest movement. In Tahrir
Square, protestors reportedly staged some small-scale
celebrations after news of Soleimani’s death on Friday, but eyewitness
accounts have subsequently suggested that overall, the news had a
sobering effect on the protest atmosphere, as anticipation of a
crackdown swells. Expressing anti-Iranian sentiment threatens to be
quickly transformed from a legitimate right to an act of national
treachery.
Note: The CRP blogs gives the views of the author, not the position of
the Con ict Research Programme, the London School of Economics
and Political Science, or the UK Government.
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